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Abstract
This paper examines some determinants of top income shares and the aggregate wealthincome ratio in the United States. The paper, first, points out the difficulties in Piketty’s
neo-classical version of explanation of US income inequality, which stresses the e↵ect of the
rising aggregate wealth-income ratio and high elasticity of factor substitution. Second, the
analysis, based on a Cambridge two-class model along the lines of Kaldor (1955/56, 1966)
and Pasinetti (1962), highlights the role of financialization in increasing inequality. Third,
the analysis suggests that the rise in the aggregate wealth-income ratio from 1980 to 2007
in the US is explained mostly by asset price inflation, not by technical relations. Finally,
the analysis examines the e↵ects of the slowdown in capital accumulation on income
distribution and wealth-income ratios, which are very di↵erent from those in Piketty’s
Capital in the twenty first century.
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Introduction

This paper attempts to o↵er an explanation of the increase in top income shares and the
rise in the wealth-income ratio in the United States since the early 1980s, during which there
was no sustained increase in the reproducible capital-output ratio. The analysis is based on
a Cambridge two-class model developed in Ryoo (2016b), which extends Kaldor (1955/56,
1966) and Pasinetti (1962) along the lines of Skott (1981, 1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008).
Some empirical components of this paper are motivated by recent findings of Piketty and Saez
⇤
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(2003), Piketty (2014) and Saez and Zucman (2014) regarding income and wealth distribution
in the U.S.1
The paper starts to point out the difficulties of Piketty’s neo-classical version of explanation
of US income inequality which is based on the combination of the rising aggregate wealthincome ratio and high elasticity of factor substitution (section 2). The paper next presents
an alternative model (section 3). The model economy assumes the capital-output ratio is
exogenous and the long-run growth rate is fixed by the exogenous natural growth rate. The
model consists of the corporate sector and the household sector. The household sector is
further divided into capitalists (the top) and workers (the rest). There are two assets (stocks
and deposits) which are available for both the top and the rest. Both classes earn labor income,
but the labor income of the top is largely top managerial pay which I treat as a deduction
from broadly defined profits. Capitalists in this model intend to capture around the top one
percent of the wealth distribution in the economy. Thus the analysis in this paper presumes
that the capitalists’ shares of income and wealth roughly correspond to those of the top one
percent of the wealth distribution in the US economy.2 Based on this theoretical framework,
the analysis identifies a number of factors that may have raised the top income share in the
U.S since the 1980s. These include several developments associated with financialization such
as increases in the dividend payout and stock buybacks, increasing indebtedness of lowerincome households, and asset bubbles (section 4). A further analysis shows that the rise in
the aggregate wealth-income ratio from 1980 to 2007 is explained mostly by the rising wealthincome ratios of the top and the bottom, which themselves were heavily influenced by asset
price inflation (section 5).
Throughout this paper, I also examine the e↵ects of the slowdown in capital accumulation
on income distribution and the wealth-income ratio. The analytic results are very di↵erent
from Piketty’s arguments in his Capital in the twenty first century. In this Cambridge two
class economy, the fall in the growth rate of capital tends to reduce the top income shares,
which decreases the aggregate wealth-income ratio.

2

Implications of some empirical observations for neoclassical
growth models

2.1

The long-run trend of the growth rate of capital, the capital-output
ratio and the profit share

The growth rate of capital, the capital-output ratio and the profit share are among the most
important variables in various models of growth and distribution. Therefore it is worth looking
1

James Galbraith (1998, 2012) has documented the increasing trend in income inequality, independently of
Piketty and his colleagues. A referee informed me that the analysis in this paper shares Galbraith’s emphasis
on the role of finance and asset price inflation in increasing inequality.
2
This presumption does not appear to be greatly misleading. The recent empirical study by Mohun (2016)
estimates the class structure of the US economy. Mohun identifies the capitalist class as the group of individuals
whose non-labor income is high enough to a↵ord a standard of living that allow non-participation in the labor
market. According to the study, the size of the capitalist class identified this way varies over time but is close
to the top one percent of the income distribution.
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at some empirical observations of those variables. The data presented below are largely based
on the Penn World Table 8.0 (PWT) which has been widely used in contemporary growth
studies.
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Figure 1: The growth rate of capital in the US (1952-2011)
Sources: Author’s computations from the Penn World Table 8.0. The growth rate of capital is computed as a
log-di↵erence of the variable ‘rkna’ (real capital stock) in PWT.

Perhaps the least controversial among those three variables is the movement of the growth
rate of capital, when it comes to the fact itself. Most would agree that there has been a decline
in the long-run growth rate since the collapse of the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism.’ According
to the Penn World Table, for instance, the annual average growth rate of capital in the U.S.
was 3.8% in 1952-1970 and 2.6% in 1981-2007, respectively (see Figure 1). The interpretation
of the fact, however, would be theory-dependent. Some theories may see the observed decline
in the growth rate as a result of an exogenous decrease in the natural growth rate (the sum of
the rates of the labor force growth and Harrod-neutral technical progress), while others may
see it as an induced outcome.3
Turning to the measure of distributive shares at the functional level, it has been widely
recognized that the labor share has declined since the early 1980s in many OECD countries.
This appears to be also true for the U.S. Defining the profit share as one minus the labor
3
The average growth rate of population in the U.S. has decreased from 1.49% in 1950-1970 to 0.99% in in
1971-2007 (Penn world table). The reduction in population growth is about half of the decline in the long-run
average growth rates of output and capital. Piketty and Zucman (2014) argue that variations in income growth
rates are mostly driven by changes in population growth while the productivity growth is approximately the
same across the advanced countries.
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share estimated by PWT, the profit share had increased by 4 percentage points from 1982
to 2010 (Figure 2). The moderate increase in the conventionally measured profit share may
underestimate the actual increase in ‘surplus’ in the US economy. It has been argued that the
sharp increase in the labor income of the top income group – such as CEO pay, bonuses and
salaries of investment bankers and corporate lawyers – has been a characteristic feature of the
US economy since the 1980s. Such wages and salaries at the top end are registered as labor
income in normal accounting practices. However, there is a long-standing perspective that
treats ‘wages’ at the top end as part of profits rather than wages,4 e.g. Marx (1984)[Ch.23],
Kalecki (1938)[p.97] and Minsky (1986)[p.154]. If the concept of profits is expanded to include
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Figure 2: Profit shares in the US
Notes: The thin solid line plots the values of (1 labor share) in The Penn World Table 8.0. The thick solid
line is constructed by including labor income of the top 1% rich in the measure of profits. The dotted line
adjusts the thick solid line for the 1980s tax e↵ects.
The data on labor income of the top 1% rich and total income from the tax returns data are from Piketty and
Saez (2003)[updated data, 2013]

the labor income at the top end of personal income distribution, the rise in the resulting
measure of the profit share in the US economy becomes more pronounced. The thick solid
line in Figure 2 shows the movement of the expanded profit share by including in it the
labor income of the top one percent income group. The expanded profit share had risen by 8
percentage points from 38% in 1970 to 46% in 2010.
The increasing gap between the conventionally measured and the expanded profit shares
corresponds to the increasing share of the top one percent labor income since the early 1980s,
4

Mohun (2006) provides an empirical analysis along the lines.
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as documented by Piketty and Saez. It has been pointed out, however, that the major
increase in the top income share is largely explained by the tax e↵ects in the 1980s (see
Galbraith (2012)[pp.149-150], for instance). More specifically, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
substantially broadened the definition of taxable income for top earners. A referee also made
me aware that the tax cuts of the early Reagan administration incentivized ‘businesses to
shift e↵ective compensation from the form of company-provided perks, previously treated as
business expenses, directly into the private income’ of managers, owners, top employees and
rich professionals. These tax e↵ects reflect changes in accounting, not in the structure of the
economy itself. The expanded profit share measured by the thick solid line in Figure 2 thus
needs to be adjusted for these tax e↵ects. The lower bound of the adjusted measure can be
obtained by assuming that the major increase in the top income share from 1981 to 1988
is entirely due to these tax e↵ects (see the dotted line in Figure 2). After this adjustment,
the resulting measure of the expanded profit share had risen from 38% in 1970 to 44.5% in
2010 by 6.5 percentage points, which is still greater than the increase in the conventionally
measured profit share.
Another important observation from the Penn World Table, finally, is that there is no
appreciable upward trend in the capital-output ratio in the US since the 1980s. Figure 3
shows that the capital-output ratio based on PWT had actually fallen from 3.5 in 1982 to
3.0 in 2007, where capital is measured by the perpetual inventory method and intends to
capture the size of productive assets.5 In contrast, the wealth-income ratio measured by Saez
and Zucman (2014), whether or not it includes housing wealth, exhibits a marked increase
since the 80s, interrupted by significant downturns in 2000 and 2007, where wealth includes
all marketable wealth net of liabilities (housing, stocks, fixed income assets, pension wealth,
net of mortgage and non-mortgage debt). The general trend of the wealth-income ratio by
Saez and Zucman is similar to that in Piketty (2014) and that based on the Fed flow of funds
data.
As well-known, Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2014) used the textbook Solow
growth model to explain the observed increase in the capital income share. In this neoclassical account, the increase in the wealth-income ratio is seen as a key driving force behind
the rise in the capital share. Critical in the argument is Piketty’s interchangeable use of the
terms, ‘capital’ and ‘wealth’.6 Identifying the observed increase in the wealth-income ratio
with the increase in the capital-output ratio in the aggregate production function, Piketty
suggests that the observed increase in the capital share is caused by the increase in ‘the
capital-output ratio’ given the assumption that the aggregate production has an elasticity of
factor substitution far greater than unity. Piketty’s conflation of capital and wealth has been
criticized on various grounds (Galbraith, 2014, Rowthorn, 2014, Jones, 2015, Stiglitz, 2015,
Weil, 2015). The di↵erent movement of the capital-output ratio and the wealth-income ratio
shown in Figure 3 poses a challenge to Piketty’s neoclassical version of explaining the rise of
inequality in functional income distribution.
5

The decline in the capital-output ratio during this period is also found in Franke (2016).
Piketty defines capital as “the total market value of everything owned by the residents and government of
a given country at a given point in time, provided that it can be traded on some market (Piketty, 2014) [p.48]
6
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Figure 3: The wealth-income ratios in the US
Sources: The Penn World Table 8.0. Saez and Zucman (2014). Author’s computations

2.2

Implications for baseline neoclassical theories

The observed movement – the rise in the profit share and the fall in both the growth rate
and the capital-output ratio in the US economy since the 1980s, assuming it is an accurate
description – has two implications for growth models.7 One is specific for simple neoclassical
type of models such as the Solow and the Ramsey models, and the other is general for any
model of growth and distribution.
First, the increase in the capital share and the fall in the capital-output ratio has implications for the degree of factor substitution between capital and labor. Factor substitution
between capital and labor is a key mechanism to bring savings into line with investment in
neoclassical growth theories. Under the assumption of perfect competition, the capital share
is negatively (positively) related to the capital-output ratio if and only if the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital is less (greater) than one. The Cobb-Douglas production function is the borderline case with unit elasticity where the capital share is invariant
to changes in the capital-output ratio. Formally, assuming that the aggregate production
7

A referee questioned the robustness of the observation that the capital-output ratio had fallen from the
early 1980s to 2007. As acknowledged by the referee, however, the general arguments in this section are valid
as far as the capital-output ratio is non-increasing.
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function takes a CES form of capital K and labor L with the elasticity of substitution ,
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the return on capital – the interest rate r – is equal to the marginal productivity of capital
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Y
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◆

1

.

(3)

The fall in K/Y and the increase in the capital share requires the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital to be less than unity, and this suggests that any explanation to
reconcile the neoclassical framework to the observed fall in K/Y would be very di↵erent from
what Piketty o↵ered under the assumption of the elasticity greater than one.
The second implication of the stylized facts is related to the investment-saving relation
in the steady state. Consider the textbook Solow-Swan model, where the saving rate s is
taken as exogenous and, along with full employment assumption, the labor force grows at a
constant rate n. Steady growth requirements are given by g = n and Ŷ = K̂. The equilibrium
capital-capital ratio is determined by
✓ ◆⇤
s
K
=
(4)
n
Y
Based on this well-known equality, Piketty argues that the increase in the ‘capital-output
ratio’ has been caused by a reduction in the growth rate. However, the increase in the capitaloutput ratio in the US, which should be distinguished from the wealth-income ratio, is far
from being clear and the data from the Penn World Table suggests otherwise, as already
pointed out. If the capital-output ratio has actually fallen while the long-run growth rate
has declined, the investment-saving relation becomes inconsistent with the assumption of the
constancy of the average saving rate: the average saving rate must have fallen faster than the
fall in the growth rate for the capital-output ratio to decline.8 More modestly, even if one
reads the observed trend of K/Y as approximately constant, rather than falling, the constant
average saving rate is still inconsistent with the decline in the natural growth rate under the
investment-saving equilibrium relation.
8

The same implication applies to the Ramsey model that endogenizes the saving rate. Assuming that
the instantaneous utility function of the representative household is logarithmic with standard exponential
discounting, the Euler rule fixes the equilibrium interest rate by r⇤ = ⇢ + n where ⇢ is the discount rate. Using
(2), we have
✓ ◆⇤ ✓
◆
K
b
=
Y
⇢+n
The capital-output ratio, ceteris paribus, is inversely related to n. The decline in the capital-output ratio is
consistent with the fall in the growth rate only if there is a large increase in ⇢, for a given value of b.

7

In general, the assumption of a downward shift in the saving function is necessary to
make the IS relation consistent with non-increasing capital-output ratio and falling growth
rate. This point also applies to various heterodox models of growth and distribution where
the average saving rate is typically an increasing function of the profit share. The observed
increase in the profit share must have increased s, but the combination of the fall in g and
K/Y requires s to fall.9

3

A Cambridge two-class corporate economy

This section extends a basic Kaldorian model by introducing corporate firms’ financial behavior, financial stocks and two social classes explicitly.10 The general structure of the model is
similar to that in Skott (1981, 1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008), but the household sector is
disaggregated into two social classes, ‘capitalists’ and ‘workers’. Both capitalists and workers
make wages, dividends on stocks and interest incomes on deposits, but wages of the capitalist
households are modeled as an allocation of profits by corporations in the form of the compensation for top managers. The model assumes a fixed-coefficients production technology. The
capital-output ratio is taken as exogenous on the grounds of limited factor substitutability
and Harrodian investment behavior (Y /K = u where u is constant). The economy is mature
and the long-run growth rate of capital and output g is determined by the (exogenous) natural
growth rate n, i.e., g = n.11 A key Kaldorian feature of the model lies in the endogenous
adjustment of the profit share to clear the product market.
The framework developed in this model has several motivations:
1. A careful modeling of the saving side requires the introduction of the corporate sector
given that firms’ financial practices such as the payout policy and the equity issue policy
have important implications for savings and distribution.
2. The identification of capital with wealth is questionable. It would be desirable to introduce financial stocks explicitly.
3. Given the importance of increasing inequality at the level of personal income distribution
both in income and wealth, the model with heterogeneous households is necessary.
4. The model needs to address the increasing importance of managerial compensation in
income distribution.
9
The empirical observation of the rise in the profit share, the fall in g and non-increasing K/Y has an
implication specific for popular Kaleckian models where capital accumulation depends positively on the profit
share and the output-capital ratio. The observed decline in capital accumulation should be explained by a
large downward shift in the accumulation function that more than o↵sets positive inducements to accumulation
coming from the rise in the profit share. This point is independent of whether the economy is ‘profit-led’ or
‘wage-led.’
10
This section heavily draws on a Kaldorian model in Ryoo (2016b) and summarizes the features and the
results of the model. The detailed analysis and arguments are found in the original paper.
11
The assumption that the long-run growth rate equals the natural rate does not mean that the economy
achieves full-employment in the long-run. The analysis in this paper assumes that the employment rate
is determined through the interaction between the goods and the labor markets as in Skott (1989), where
changes in aggregate demand have level e↵ects on output and employment.
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Firms’ financial decisions and managerial pay The firms’ budget constraint is written
as
pI + Ww + Wc + Div + iM = pY + v Ṅ + Ṁ
(5)
where p is the price of output, I real investment, Ww wages to workers, Wc top managerial
pay, Div dividends, i the nominal interest rate, M bank loans, Y real output, v the unit price
of stocks, and N the number of stocks. A dot over a variable refers to the time derivative of
the variable.
A broad definition of profits ⇧ is introduced, which captures the excess of total revenue
over wages to workers:
⇧ = pY Ww or Ww = (1 ⇡)pY
(6)
where ⇡ is the profit share, ⇡ ⌘ ⇧/(pY ). Firms pay a constant fraction of profits – net of
depreciation and interest payments – to top managers as salaries and bonus.12
Wc = (⇧

pK

rM )

(7)

where r is the real interest rate.
The rest of surplus is broken into dividends and retained earnings
Div = (1

sf )(1

)(⇧

pK

rM )

(8)

where sf is the retention rate that is exogenously determined by the firms’ retention policy.
Firms also make decision on equity financing policy. The equity issue policy is captured
by an exogenous parameter, N̂ , the growth rate of the number of stocks.13
Banks The banking sector is modeled following a simple endogenous money story. Banks
set the real interest rate on loans at r exogenously. Banks make loans to firms and accept
deposits from households. Under simplifying assumptions,14 ‘loans create the same amount
of deposits,’ represented by the following balance sheet relation:
M = M c + Mw

(9)

where Mc and Mw are the level of deposits held by capitalists and workers, respectively.
Capitalists and workers The household sector is divided into the capitalists’ and the
workers’ households. Their budget constraints are given by:
pCj + v Ṅj + Ṁj = Wj + Divj + iMj ,
12

j = c, w

(10)

This specification is distinguished from the typical approach in the recent post-Keynesian literature that
assumes that managerial compensation is in a definite relation to wages for non-managerial labor through
structurally determined ‘wage’ premium.
13
N̂ can be either positive or negative (or zero). A negative value of N̂ means the net acquisition of stocks
by the firm sector from households (stock buybacks).
14
I assume that the rate of interest on loans equals that on deposits, banks do not hold any other asset than
loans, nobody holds cash, and banking does not incur costs other than the interest payments on depositors.
Given these assumptions, banks do not make pure profits, their net worth equals zero.

9

The subscript j refers to the types of households (c for capitalists and w for workers). Wj ,
Divj , and iMj are labor income, dividends and interest income, respectively. Note Wc stands
for managerial compensation for capitalists. Cj is real consumption. v Ṅj and Ṁj are net
acquisition of stocks and deposits by j-class.
Each class receives dividends from firms in proportion to their share of stock ownership.
In equilibrium, the total number of shares will be equal to the sum of the shares held by
capitalists and workers, N = Nc + Nw . The class-share of stocks is denoted as kj ⌘ Nj /N
with kc + kw = 1. Dividends can be written as:
Divj = kj · Div = kj (1

sf )(1

)(⇧

pK

rM ),

j = c, w

(11)

As will be shown, the distribution of stocks kj is endogenously determined jointly with the
profit share ⇡ in the steady state.
Following the approach in Skott (1981, 1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008), households’
saving/portfolio behavior is specified in terms of their desired stock-flow ratios:
vNj = ↵j pYj
Mj =

j pYj ,

(12)
j = c, w

(13)

where Yj ’s are capitalist and workers’ real income and defined as
Yj = (Wj + Divj + rMj )/p

(14)

↵j ’s and j ’s are the ratios of stock and deposit holdings to income that each class desires
to achieve, respectively. I will assume that ↵j ’s and j ’s are exogenous in the benchmark
model.15 Appendix I analyzes three alternative specifications that endogenize ↵j and j ,
which do not change qualitative results.
Using (9), (11), (13), and (14), the households’ income can be expressed as a function of
the profit share and the share of stocks:
Yc /K ⌘ yc (⇡n , kc ) =
Yw /K ⌘ yw (⇡n , kc ) =

a(kc )(
[(1

a(kc )(⇡n
w )r + (1

c

c r)(1

a(kc )(

c

s⇤f ⇡n )
w )r

+ (1

w r)un
c r)(1

s⇤f

w r)

a(kc )(⇡n
c r)(1

c r)]un

s⇤f

w r)

(15)
(16)

where un ⌘ u
, ⇡n ⌘ (⇡u
)/un , a(kc ) ⌘ + (1 sf )(1
)kc , and s⇤f ⌘ sf (1
).
un is aggregate income net of depreciation measured in capital stock and ⇡n the share of net
profits in net income. a(kc ) represents the share of the capitalists’ claims in profits net of
depreciation and interest payments. s⇤f represents the e↵ective retention ratio which takes
15
The desired stock-flow ratios may depend on a number of variables such as the rates of return on various
assets and the growth rate of incomes, but comparative statics are simplified if those ratios are taken as
exogenous. The results with exogenous stock-flow ratios will carry over to the general case with variable ratios
if the e↵ects from induced changes in the ratios are relatively small. Skott (1981, 1989) introduced the stockflow specification of saving/portfolio behavior. Skott and Ryoo (2008) and Ryoo and Skott (2008) applied this
approach to the study of financialization.
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into account the deduction of top manager pay from profits. It can be readily shown that
(15) is increasing in ⇡n and kc and (16) decreasing in ⇡n and kc : a rise in the profit share or
a rise in the capitalists’ share of stocks shifts personal income in favor of capitalists.
The stock-flow ratios (12) and (13), together with the budget constraints (10), can be used
to derive steady-growth consumption functions. On a steady growth path, the share of stock
ownership kj and the class-share of income remain constant, and therefore N̂c = N̂w = N̂
and Ŷc = Ŷw = n. Given these requirements, (12), (13), (10) and (14) yield steady-growth
consumption functions for workers and capitalists:
Cj = (1

sj )Yj , where sj ⌘ ↵j N̂ +

j n,

j = c, w

(17)

where ↵j N̂ + j n represents the ratio of newly acquired financial stocks to income and thus
the average saving rate of class j. I will follow a standard assumption sc > sw .16
Product market equilibrium

The equilibrium condition for the goods market is given by
Cc + Cw + I = Y

(18)

and, using (17) and (14), can be written as
(1

sc )yc (⇡n , kc ) + (1

sw )yw (⇡n , kc ) + n = un

(19)

where yc (⇡n , kc ) and yw (⇡n , kc ) are given by (15) and (16), respectively. Equation (19) can
be used to determine the profit share for a given kc . The stability condition for this Kaldorian distribution mechanism requires aggregate demand to be decreasing in the profit share.
Formally,
⇤
(sc sw )a(kc ) + (1 sw )(1
(20)
c r)sf > 0
Under condition (20), (19) can be solved for the equilibrium profit share for any given level
of kc :
(◆ sw )[a(kc )( c
s⇤f w r)]
w )r + (1
c r)(1
⇡n⇤ (kc ) =
+ wr
(21)
⇤
(sc sw )a(kc ) + (1 sw )(1
c r)sf
where ◆ is the share of net investment in net output, ◆ ⌘ n/un .
Equation (21) then is used to determine the division of income between capitalists and
workers as a function of kc . Substituting (21) back into (15) and (16) yields:
yc (⇡n⇤ (kc ), kc ) =
yw (⇡n⇤ (kc ), kc ) =

(sc

a(kc )(◆ sw )un
sw )a(kc ) + (1 sw )(1

[a(kc )(sc
(sc

◆) + (1

sw )a(kc ) + (1

◆)(1
sw )(1

⇤
c r)sf
⇤
c r)sf ]un
⇤
c r)sf

(22)
(23)

The capitalists’ income (22) will be strictly positive if and only if
◆ > sw ,
16

↵j ,

(24)

Note that sc > sw , a typical assumption in post-Keynesian/structuralist models, imposes restrictions over
j , N̂ and n.
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i.e., the workers’ saving rate should not be too large.17 The workers’ income (23), on the
other hand, will be positive for all possible states of stock ownership distribution if
a(1)(sc

◆) + (1

⇤
c r)sf

◆)(1

> 0.

(25)

Once the steady state value of kc is found, the model is fully solved.
Steady state Dividing (22) by (23), the ratio of the capitalists’ income to the workers’ is
expressed as a function of kc .
yc
a(kc )(◆
⌘x=
yw
a(kc )(sc ◆) + (1

sw )
◆)(1

r c )s⇤f

⌘ F (kc )

(26)

x, the ratio of the capitalists’ income to the workers’, serves as a measure of income inequality
in this model.
The capitalists’ share of stocks kc , on the other hand, is determined by income distribution
between the two classes:
↵

kc =

c
x
↵ c yc
= ↵w↵c ⌘ G(x)
↵ c yc + ↵ w yw
1 + ↵w x

(27)

The steady state requires the mutual consistency of (26) and (27), and it can be shown that
there exists a unique steady state (x⇤ , kc⇤ ) such that x⇤ = F (kc⇤ ) and kc⇤ = G(x⇤ ) (Ryoo,
2016b).

4

Determinants of the capitalists’ income share (‘top income
share’)

The US economy has gone through major structural changes since the early 1980s. As for the
changes that can be captured by the present model, Table 2 summarizes some of the stylized
facts. The average growth rate of capital in the period after 1980 has been lower than the
Golden age of capitalism in the 50s and the 60s. This may be interpreted as a permanent
decrease in the natural rate of growth (n) in this framework. The fraction of top managerial
income in profits ( ) has increased, whereas the corporate retention rate (sf ) and the rate of
net new equity issues (N̂ ) have fallen sharply. Table 1 shows main comparative statics.

4.1

The rate of economic growth (n)

The reduction in the natural growth rate has an implication for aggregate demand and distributional consequences in the Kaldorian framework. A once-and-for-all decrease in the natural
growth rate represents a permanent decline in the steady-growth level of investment demand
relative to capital stock. The fall in investment demand will lower the profit share and the
17

The violation of (24) leads to too low a profit share, which makes the capitalists’ income vanish. (24) is
the familiar viability condition for a two-class economy in the Pasinetti model (Pasinetti, 1962, Samuelson and
Modigliani, 1966).
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Table 1: Comparative statics
n

sf

N̂

w

⇤
yc⇤ /yw

+

+

kc⇤

+

+

Table 2: Some stylized facts
⇤

sf

N̂

1952-1970

.56

.004

.074

.038

n

1981-2012

.33

-.019

.158

.024

Notes: sf and N̂ are calculated from the FRB flow of funds accounts.
is based on the FRB flow of funds
accounts and Piketty and Saez (2003)[2013, updated]. (Profits in the formula of ⇤ are gross profits including
depreciation and before interest payments.
in the theoretical model is the fraction of wages out of profits
net of both depreciation and interest payments and its actual values are likely about twice ⇤ ). The values of
n are calculated from the Penn World Table 8.0.

capitalist share of income, other things being equal. The size of the e↵ect of a fall in n on
⇡ can be large. With the baseline values in Table 3, a fall in the growth rate from 3.8% to
2.4% reduces the expanded profit share (⇡) by 7.85 percentage points and the conventionally
measured profit share by 6.7 percentage points. The change in functional income distribution
is associated with a decline in the capitalists’ share of income and wealth. The capitalists’
income share falls by 4.81 percentage points. In other words, the observed decline in the
rate of capital accumulation represents a significant stagnationary pressure over aggregate
demand, which might have reduced the profit share and top income shares in the absence of
any o↵setting e↵ect. This result is in stark contrast to the argument in Piketty (2014) that
slow growth causes high inequality.

4.2

Distributional implications of financialization

The global economy saw profound changes in the financial sector and its increasing dominance
over the other part of the economy. The implications of changes in the structure and the
behavior of the financial sector have been examined under the heading of financialization.18
I will focus on a small subset of the developments associated with financialization which are
closely related to the results from the model analyzed in this paper.
The retention rate of non-financial corporations in the US decreased significantly from
56% in 1952-1970 to 33% in 1981-2012: the U.S. corporations have paid out the greater
portion of their earnings to their shareholders in the recent decades. This is captured by the
18

There are a number of studies on financialization, including (Epstein, 2005, Stockhammer, 2004, Skott and
Ryoo, 2008, Ryoo and Skott, 2008, Hein, 2012, Palley, 2013).

13

Table 3: Comparative statics: numerical illustrations
initial
equilibrium

fall in n

rise in

fall in sf

fall in N̂

all changes
combined

⇡

39.94%

32.09%

43.20%

49.15%

42.97%

50.00%

conventional
⇡

36.73%

30.03%

35.97%

44.69%

39.33%

40.95%

k
yc
yc +yw

36.33%

20.93%

52.93%

60.13%

42.25%

66.88%

9.40%

4.59%

16.97%

21.52%

11.74%

26.85%

Notes: The benchmark parameters are n = 0.038, = 0.15, sf = 0.55, N̂ = 0.004, u = 0.3, = 0.05, r = 0.03,
↵c = 3.3, c = 3.5, ↵w = 0.6 and w = 0.6. The alternative values for simulations are n = 0.024, = 0.3,
sf = 0.35 and N̂ = 0.019. The conventional ⇡ refers to the measure of the profit share that results from
deducting top management pay (Wc ) from the broadly defined profit, i.e.,
⇧

(⇧

pK
pY

rM )

=

⇡ ⇤ u⇤

(⇡ ⇤ u⇤
u⇤

rm⇤ )

reduction in sf in the present model. The initial impact e↵ect of a fall in sf benefits both
the capitalists’ and workers’ household by raising their dividend income, but because the fall
in the retention rate represents an income transfer from the high saving sector (corporations)
to the low saving sector (households), it tends to stimulate aggregate demand and increase
the profit share. The increase in the profit share gives an additional benefit to the capitalists’
households because of increased managerial compensation, at the expense of the share of
wages of the workers’ households. Induced changes in the distribution of stock holdings (kc )
make the demand e↵ect of a fall in sf less certain, but it turns out that the capitalists’ share
of income increases unambiguously. The overall distributional e↵ect of the fall in the retention
rate is quantitatively very large. With the benchmark parameters (Table 3), the fall in sf from
0.55 to 0.35 increases both the profit share and the capitalists’ share of income significantly,
by about 10 and 12 percentage points, respectively. This e↵ect alone more than o↵sets the
negative e↵ect of the fall in the growth rate on the profit share and the top income share.
The rate of net new equity issues by non-financial corporations was small but positive,
0.004 on average in the 1952-1970, but the figures turned to large negative numbers in 19812012, -0.019 on average. The fall in N̂ means net acquisition of stocks by households decreases,
and thus it reduces the household saving rate and stimulates consumption demand. The profit
share will increase and raise the capitalists’ share of income similarly to the case of the fall in
sf (see Table 3 for numerical illustrations).
Increasing household indebtedness (esp. of lower income households) is another important
development since the 1980s. Increasing household debt has received great attention recently
especially as a consequence of increasing inequality, but it can also be a cause of increasing
inequality. The model economy in this model highlights this aspect. High indebtedness of
lower income households can be captured by a fall in w since w stands for fixed income
assets net of debt. Figure 4, which is constructed using the Saez-Zucman data, shows the net
14
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Figure 4: Ratio of nonequity-nonhousing net worth to income of the bottom 99% wealth
group ( w )
Notes: Author’s calculations from Saez and Zucman (2014). I recategorized the five items in the net worth
of the bottom 99% wealth (stocks, net housing, fixed income assets, enterprise income and pension wealth) in
the Saez-Zucman data into the three items (corporate equity, gross housing, and the others). In doing so, I
decomposed pension wealth into stocks and the other assets assuming the composition follows that of stocks
and fixed income assets in the five-items classification. I also converted net housing (housing net of mortgages
in the Saez-Zucman data) into gross housing by taking the mortgage component out and adding it to ‘the
others’ (as a negative value). The chart plots the values of ‘the others’ and intends to capture the movement
of w in this paper.

worth of the bottom 99% wealth class excluding corporate equity and housing relative to their
income had fallen dramatically since the early 1980s. This movement reflects the well-known
increase in the debt-income ratio of the bottom 99% wealth class, which is mostly explained
by increasing mortgage debt.19 The decrease in w – the increase in the debt-income ratio
– has conflicting e↵ects on aggregate demand and the profit share. On the one hand, it
corresponds to a decrease in net interest income (an increase in debt servicing) of workers
(low savers), but, a lower w means a fall in net acquisition of fixed income asset (or a rise in
net borrowing) and reduces the saving rate of workers. Depending on the relative strength of
the two e↵ects, the profit share may rise or fall. The first e↵ect, it turns out, remains primary
when it comes to its e↵ect on the distribution between workers and capitalists, regardless of
how functional income distribution shifts. The e↵ect of interest income transfer (away from
19
A referee pointed out the importance of the 1986 Tax Reform Act for the rise in mortgage debt. Before
1986, all interest expenditure was tax-deductible, but, after the 1986 reform act, only mortgage interest was
deductible. As a result, many types of lending and borrowing shifted into the mortgage rubric. In particular,
small business liabilities were shifted onto personal balance sheets, and secured by personal housing. I am
grateful to the referee for providing this detailed account.
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the workers’ households) is dominant20 and it unambiguously raises the top income share.
The positive e↵ect of rising household debt (a fall in w ) on the top income share may
indirectly capture the distributional e↵ect of a housing market boom (which is typically shown
in high housing/income ratios. See Figure 5). The increases in the housing/income ratio and
the debt-income ratio tends to reinforce each other via the well-known interaction between
asset price and credit supply, and the fall in w in the 2000s may be seen as a result of such
interaction.21
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

Figure 5: (Gross) Housing wealth-income ratio of the bottom 99% wealth group
Notes: Author’s calculations from Saez and Zucman (2014). See the notes in Figure 4 for the detail.

A stock market boom may be captured by a rise in ↵c and ↵w . The ratio of corporate
equity to income, constructed from the Saez-Zucman data, increased from 1.92 in 1980 to
4.33 in 2007 for the top 1% wealth class. During the same period, the equity-income ratio for
the rest 99% group rose from 0.34 to 0.97 (Table 5). The rising trend in the equity-income
ratios was particularly pronounced in the 1990s, as expected.
The impact e↵ect of changes in ↵j ’s on aggregate demand works through its impact on
the personal saving rates (recall sj = ↵j N̂ + j n) and thus depends on the sign of the rate of
net equity issues N̂ . If N̂ = 0, the e↵ect of changes in ↵j on the saving rate is neutral and
thus there will be no impact e↵ect on aggregate demand and income distribution.22 During
20

Because of this, even in the case where a fall in w has a positive e↵ect on demand and the profit share,
the magnitude is small in simulations for a range of parameter values.
21
The analysis of macroeconomic interaction between housing prices and debt dynamics is complex and
beyond the scope of this paper. See Ryoo (2016a) for an attempt to formalize such interaction along the
Minsky-Kaldor lines.
22
There will be a change in the distribution of stocks (kc ), which a↵ects demand and the profit share. But
this e↵ect will be small compared to the case when ↵j is nonzero.
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the Golden Age, ↵j ’s increased and drove a long stock market boom until the mid 60s, but
since N̂ was close to zero on average, the increase in ↵j ’s did not lead to any large movement
in income distribution either at the functional or personal levels.
The situation was very di↵erent during the period from the early 1980s until 2007. There
were massive scale stock buybacks (N̂ ⇡ 0.02 on average). If N̂ < 0, an increase in ↵j ’s
reduces personal saving rates, which tends to stimulate aggregate demand and raise the profit
share and the top income share.23 Such distributional e↵ects were strong especially during
the 1990s’ stock market boom.

4.3

The share of top labor income in total profits ( )
0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Figure 6: The ratio of the top 1% group labor income to broadly defined profits in the US
Notes: The share of wages in broad profits is calculated by dividing the share of top 1 % group’s labor income in
GDP by the broadly defined profit share. The figure may roughly correspond to Wc /⇧ in this paper. Author’s
calculations based on Penn World Table and Piketty and Saez (2003)[updated data, 2013].

Figure 6 shows that the ratio of labor income of the top 1% rich to the broadly defined
profits varied little around 7% in the 50s and 60s, but continued to rise since then, reaching
historical high at 20.6% in 2000.24 Looking at the data this way highlights a significant change
23
The precise total e↵ect on distributive shares again depends also on the endogenous adjustment of stock
ownership distribution (kc ). If N̂ < 0 and both ↵c and ↵w increases, the total e↵ect on the top income and
wealth shares depends on the movement of ↵c /↵w . If ↵c /↵w has increased, the top income and wealth shares
unambiguously increases. This result remains valid unless ↵c /↵w falls too much. This case roughly captures
what the US economy experienced from the early 1980s until 2007. See Ryoo (2016b) for the analytic details.
24
As pointed by a referee, the sharp rise around 1986-1988 is mainly due to the e↵ect of the 1986 Tax Reform
Act, as discussed in section 2.1, and therefore the data since 1986 exaggerate the actual increase in the ratio
of top labor income to profits by about three percentage points.
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in the way how profits are allocated by firms in the past decades. This change is captured by
an increase in in the present model.
How a rise in a↵ects aggregate demand and the profit share in this model is somewhat
complex because it represents both an income transfer from the corporate sector (high saving
sector) to the capitalist households (low saving sector) and a transfer from the workers’
households (low savers) to the capitalists’ (high savers). When the first channel – a reduction
in the e↵ective retention rate s⇤f = sf (1
) – is stronger, the rise in can raise aggregate
demand and the profit share by stimulating capitalists’ consumption demand (otherwise that
part of profits would have been saved in the form of retained earnings). The e↵ect of a rise in
on the profit share is ambiguous in general,25 but the rise in unambiguously raises income
and wealth inequality between workers and capitalists (x and k): the positive impact of the
increase in top management pay on the capitalists’ share of income remains a first-order e↵ect,
regardless of the direction of induced change in the profit share. The impact e↵ect can be
reinforced by an increase in the profit share if the aforementioned income transfer away from
the corporate sector – reduced e↵ective retention rate – is strong. The simulation result in
Table 3 illustrates such a case. With the benchmark parameters, a rise in from 0.15 to 0.30
raises the broadly defined profit share by 3.26 percentage points although the conventionally
measured profit share somewhat declines. The first-order e↵ect on the capitalists’ share of
income combined with the e↵ect of the induced increase in the profit share produces a large
increase in the capitalists’ income share by nearly 8 percentage points. The mechanism
behind the expansionary e↵ect of a rise in corporate spending on top management pay is in
line with the old wisdom of Keynes’s widow’s cruse in his Treatise on Money or Kalecki’s
dictum ‘capitalists earn what they spend.’ Minsky also argued that corporate spending on
the compensation of top managers is self-financing and its distributional e↵ect tends to be
self-reinforcing due to the essentially same mechanism as in this model(Minsky, 1986)[pp.
155-156].
Table 4: The share of top management pay in national income: various determinants
initial
equilibrium
pY

Wc
pK

3.84%

rise in

fall in sf and N̂

fall in n

combined e↵ect

6.40%

2.47%

10.87%

8.67%

Notes: The parameter values are the same as in Table 3.

By a change in the model intends to capture a structural change within the corporate
sector that determines the size of profits allocated to top executives and managers, but note
that increasing share of labor income of the top income class in national income is determined
by macroeconomic forces. The share of top management pay in aggregate net income is
25

The underlying mechanism is very similar to the ambiguous e↵ect of a rise in top manager wages and their
proportion in total employment on aggregate demand in the Kaleckian analysis of Dutt (2016), which also
highlights the possibility of an expansionary demand e↵ect of top management income.
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represented by Wc /(pY
pK), which is endogenous in this model. It is certainly a↵ected by
the increase in . Using the same benchmark parameters, an increase in from 0.15 to 0.30
causes the share of top management pay to increase from 3.84% to 8.67%. It is worth noting,
however, that the share of top management pay in aggregate income may have been a↵ected
by several other factors that look seemingly unrelated to the way how the broadly defined
profits are allocated as top management pay ( ). For instance, a fall in sf and N̂ can raise
the profit share and the distributive share of top management income,26 while the decline in
the growth rate has the opposite e↵ect. The quantitative e↵ects of those factors are sizable
in the present model, as shown in Table 4.
To summarize this section: the US economy has witnessed several developments which
have crucial impacts on functional and personal income distribution. The slowdown in capital
accumulation – low n – tends to decrease income and wealth inequality, but this e↵ect appears
to have been more than o↵set by those worsening inequality: the rise in and the decline in
sf , N̂ , and w , along with a long-period of asset bubbles, in the US economy since the early
1980s.

5

The aggregate wealth-income ratio

The present model assumes that the capital-output ratio – 1/u – is at the desired level,
which is taken as exogenous to simplify the analysis. The aggregate wealth-income ratio,
is however, distinguished from the capital-output ratio and determined endogenously. The
aggregate wealth-income ratio is the weighted average of those of the top rich and the rest
with the weights being given by their respective income share. In the current setting,

!⌘

N Wc + N Ww
=
pY c + pYw

c !c

+ (1

c )!w

(28)

yc
x
where c = yc +y
= 1+x
and !j = ↵j + j . The assumption of exogenous ↵j and j means
w
the wealth-income ratio for each class is exogenous. With constant !j , the aggregate wealthincome ratio ! is fully determined by the income distribution between capitalists and workers.
Empirically, the wealth-income ratio of the rich is far greater than the poor (see Figure 7 and
Table 5): !c
!w . This means that any factor that raises income inequality in favor of the
rich, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in the aggregate wealth-income ratio.

The wealth-income ratio and income inequality The positive e↵ect of higher income
inequality on the aggregate wealth-income ratio appears to have been significant in the U.S.
economy. The aggregate wealth-income ratio increased from 3.08 in 1980 to 4.66 in 2007 and
the income share of the top 1% wealthy rose from 9.14% to 16.82% (Table 5). Using the data
on the movements of individual wealth-income ratios, the total increase can be decomposed
26

A stock market boom – a rise in ↵j ’s – also raises the profit share and the share of top labor income when
net issues of equity is negative.
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Table 5: Wealth-income ratios and their components
Top 1%
income
share

total
wealth/
income

1962

10.59%

3.28

0.95

1.32

1.02

9.18

4.40

1.60

3.18

2.58

0.54

1.28

0.76

1980

9.14%

3.08

0.49

1.57

1.03

8.21

1.92

2.34

3.94

2.57

0.34

1.49

0.74

2007

16.82%

4.66

1.53

2.22

0.91

9.97

4.33

1.78

3.85

3.59

0.97

2.31

0.32

equity

housing

others

1%
wealth/
income

equity

housing

others

99%
wealth/
income

equity

housing

others

Sources: Authors’ calculations from Saez and Zucman (2014). See the notes in Figure 4 for the detail.

into the e↵ect of increasing inequality for given wealth-income ratios of di↵erent groups and
the e↵ect of changes in the individual wealth-income ratios for given income inequality.
A quick computation from Table 5 shows that if the wealth-income ratios had never
changed from 1980 for the top 1% and the rest (8.21 and 2.57, respectively), the aggregate
wealth-income ratio would have increased from 3.08 to 3.52. This change, 0.44, amounts to
about 28% of the total change in the aggregate wealth-income ratio. The increase in income
inequality thus explains a significant part of the increase in the aggregate wealth-income ratio.
Asset price inflation A larger part of the rise in the wealth-income ratio, however, is
explained by increases in individual wealth/income ratios. Table 5 shows that the wealthincome ratio increased for both classes. Even if the top 1% income share had been the same
at 9.14% over the period 1980-2007, the aggregate wealth income ratio would have increased
from 3.08 to 4.18.
Table 5 also shows the breakdown of the wealth-income ratios according to the asset types.
At the aggregate level, both the corporate equity/income ratio and the housing/income ratio
increased substantially from 0.48 to 1.53 and from 1.57 to 2.22 in period 1980-2007. This
suggests that the increase in the aggregate wealth-income ratio reflects booms in stock and
housing markets. The decline in the ratio of ‘others’ to income from 1.03 to 0.91 is largely
explained by the fall in the same ratio of the bottom 99% wealth class. The driving force of the
latter was the increase in the debt-income ratio of this class (both mortgage and non-mortgage
debt).
The comparison of the movements in the wealth-income ratios before and after 1980 may
help understand the driving forces of changes in the ratios both at the aggregate and the
disaggregate levels. Table 6 shows how the growth rate of a wealth-income ratio is broken
down into the three growth components, capital gain induced growth of wealth, saving induced
growth of wealth and the growth of income, using the language of Piketty and Zucman (2014).
The decomposition is based on a fairly straightforward identity27 :
27

The decomposition equation (29) has an affinity with the one based on the definition of ↵j if stocks are
the only household asset where the saving rate is given by sj = ↵j N̂ :
↵
ˆj =

✓ˆ◆
v
+ N̂
p

Ŷj =

20

✓ˆ◆
v
sj
+
p
↵j

Ŷj

Table 6: The decomposition of the change in the wealth-income ratios

Aggregate
Top 1%
Bottom 99%

period

growth of
wealth/income
!
ˆj

capital gain
induced growth
p̂aj

saving induced
growth
Âj

income
growth
Ŷj

1950-1979

-0.55%

-0.79%

4.05%

3.80%

1980-2007

1.72%

1.99%

2.71%

2.97%

1950-1979

-0.07%

-1.05%

3.72%

2.74%

1980-2007

1.13%

1.68%

4.40%

4.95%

1950-1979

-0.74%

-0.73%

4.21%

3.94%

1980-2007

1.42%

2.14%

1.96%

2.67%

Sources: Authors’ calculations from Saez and Zucman (2014).

!
ˆ j = p̂aj + Âj

Ŷj =

p̂aj
|{z}

+

capital gain induced

sj /!j
| {z }

saving induced

Ŷj
|{z}

(29)

income growth

where the net worth of class j is expressed by the product of the composite asset price index
paj and the quantity index of assets Aj , i.e., N Wj = paj Aj . Since the net acquisition of assets
equals the flow of savings, paj Ȧj = Sj , dividing through by paj Aj yields Âj = sj /!j . During
1950-1979, both at the aggregate and disaggregate levels, the saving-induced growth of wealth
is moderately higher than income growth, and the small positive gaps are outweighed by the
negative growth of the asset price index, by slight margins. The wealth-income ratios in
1950 had returned to a somewhat lower level in 1979 (see Figure 7). The period of 19802007 saw a strong upward movement in the wealth-income ratio both at the top and the
bottom ends. During this period, saving induced growth of wealth was lower than income
growth at all levels. The wealth-income ratios might have fallen with saving-induced wealth
accumulation alone, but the strong asset price inflation e↵ect fueled the rise in wealth-income
ratios, especially for the bottom 99% wealth class and at the aggregate level. The increase in
the wealth-income ratios and the decline in personal saving rates since the 1980s (see Figure
8 and 9) thus can be explained by strong asset price inflation.
The e↵ect of the growth rate on the aggregate wealth-income ratio The relation
between n and ! may merit attention given Piketty’s argument that slow growth caused
high wealth-income ratio. In the present model, the fall in n unambiguously reduces the
capitalists’ income share, and under the assumption of the constancy of individual wealthincome ratios, decreases the aggregate wealth-income ratio. Thus the result is in contrast to
Piketty’s argument that ‘capital is back because slow growth is back’. The result, however,
may depend on the seemingly restrictive assumption that individual wealth-income ratios !c
and !w are exogenous. Di↵erent specifications of consumption/portfolio behavior may make
wealth/income ratios for each class endogenous and furthermore make individual wealthincome ratios decreasing in the growth rate. To check the robustness of the e↵ect of changes in
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Figure 7: Wealth/income ratios by wealth class in the US
Sources: Author’s computations from Saez and Zucman (2014).

the growth rate on the aggregate wealth-income ratio, I consider three di↵erent specifications
of consumption/portfolio behavior (Model II, III, IV) along with the benchmark model (Model
I) that takes ↵j and j as exogenous.
Model II assumes exogenous ratios of financial stocks to consumption as in Skott (1981),
i.e.,
vNj = ↵
˜ j pCj and Mj = ˜j pCj
Appendix I shows that ↵j and j become endogenous under this specification and the wealthincome ratio for each class is given by
!j ⌘ ↵ j +

j

=

↵
˜ j + ˜j
1+↵
˜ j N̂ + ˜j n

(30)

Model III considers a fairly standard consumption specification as a function of income
and wealth, along with a constant portfolio ✏j for each class:
pCj = cj pYj + ⌫j (vNj + Mj )

and

✏j = vNj /Mj

Appendix I derives the implied values of wealth-income ratios:
!j = ↵ j +

j

=

(1 + ✏j )(1

cj )

✏j N̂ + n + ⌫j (1 + ✏j )

(31)

Model IV assumes the constancy of average saving ratios (1 c̄j ) for each class by dropping
the wealth-related term from (5).
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Figure 8: The personal saving rate in the US
Notes: US. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Saving Rate [PSAVERT], retrieved from FRED, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PSAVERT/, October 12, 2015.

pCj = c̄j pYj

and

✏j = vNj /Mj

The implied values of wealth-income ratios are given by
!j = ↵ j +

j

=

(1 + ✏j )(1
✏j N̂ + n

c̄j )

(32)

Model IV appears to be merely a special example of Model III when ⌫j = 0, but it turns out
to be quantitatively very di↵erent from Model III as well as the other two. All specifications
except Model I make the wealth-income ratio !j decreasing in n. Thus one may suspect
that the result that a fall in n reduces the aggregate wealth-income ratio in Model I may be
reversed in the models with endogenous wealth-income ratios. Interestingly, the di↵erence
does not lie between Model I and the others but between Model IV and the others.
Table 7 examines the e↵ect on the aggregate wealth-income ratio of a decline in the growth
rate from 0.038 to 0.024 by looking at its determinants c , !c and !w .28 The fall in n reduces
the capitalists’ share of income c in all models. This is in line with the analysis in section
4.1. In Model I, the wealth-income ratios of both classes are assumed to be constant and
therefore the decrease in the capitalists’ income share reduces the aggregate wealth-income
ratio. In Model II and III, the fall in the natural rate does a↵ect and raise the wealth-income
ratios for both classes, but the adjustment of the wealth-income ratios is modest in size and
the aggregate wealth-income ratio still declines due to the primary income distribution e↵ect.
28

Appendix II shows a further decomposition of the e↵ect of the growth rate on the wealth-income ratios.
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Figure 9: Saving rates of Top 1% and Bottom 99% wealth class in the US
Sources: Author’s computations from Saez and Zucman (2014).

What happens to Model IV, however, is very di↵erent from the other three models, where
the specification of the consumption function which only depends on income in the absence
of the influence of wealth on consumption leads to drastic changes in wealth-income ratios
(!c raises from 6.8% to 10.228% and !w raises from 1.2% to 1.8%). These e↵ects dominates
the income distribution e↵ect, and, as a result, the aggregate wealth-income ratio increases
in response to the fall in the growth rate. One may notice that the feature of Model IV is
similar to Piketty’s numerical exercises based on K/Y = s/n. A decline in n with a constant
s produces an implausibly large movement of K/Y in the neoclassical framework, especially
when the growth rate approaches zero.29
The analysis of the models with endogenous stock-flow ratios suggests that a fall in the
growth rate decreases the aggregate wealth-income ratio under plausible specifications of
consumption behavior. The main mechanism is the induced income distribution e↵ect on the
aggregate wealth-income ratio. In these Kaldorian models, a fall in the growth rate reduces
the capitalists’ share of income and thus tends to reduce the aggregate wealth-income ratio.
Therefore, the causes of the observed increase in the aggregate wealth-income ratio since the
1980s must be found somewhere else than the fall in the growth rate. As Tables 5 and 6
suggest, the upward movement of the wealth-income ratios since the early 1980s is driven by
asset price inflation for the most part and does not seem to be caused by the lower growth
rate.
29
In Model IV, the overly sensitive response of stock-flow ratios to changes in the growth rate is more visible
if the rate of equity issues is negative.
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Table 7: The e↵ect of a fall in the growth rate on the aggregate wealth-income ratio
Baseline

Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

9.4%

4.59%

4.67%

4.50%

4.14%

!c

6.8

6.8

7.150

7.562

10.228

!w

1.2

1.2

1.21

1.33

1.8

1.726

1.457

1.487

1.610

2.148

c

!=

c !c +(1

c )!w

notes: The parameter values for Model II, III and IV are chosen to produce the same stock/income ratios and
average saving rates as in Model I if n = 0.038. In other words, for all models, ↵c = 3.3, c = 3.5, !c = 6.8,
sc = 0.146, ↵w = 0.6, w = 0.6, !w = 1.2, and sw = 0.0252 when n = 0.038. The numbers in the table show
the e↵ect of a decrease in n to n = 0.024. For all cases, N̂ = 0.004, sf = 0.55, = 0.15, u = 0.3, = 0.05, and
r = 0.03.

6

Conclusion

The perspective in this paper places a strong emphasis on financial factors as the determinants of income inequality. I have suggested that several financial changes – the decline in
the retention rate, the rise in stock buybacks, increasing indebtedness of the working class
and asset market booms – a↵ect the level of aggregate demand, and such changes tend to
shift the aggregate saving function downward. The macroeconomic e↵ect of the decline in the
saving ratio di↵ers in competing models of growth and distribution. The investment-saving
equilibrium is achieved through the adjustment of the output-capital ratio both in the SolowSwan model which serves as a key theoretical framework in Piketty’s neo-classial explanation
and in Kaleckian models which are popular in the heterodox approach. The induced change
in the output-capital ratio represents the process of factor substitution along the aggregate
production function in the former and the long-run adjustment in the rate of capacity utilization in the latter. In contrast to these models, the Kaldorian model presented above takes
the output-capital ratio as exogenous, where the investment-saving equilibrium is established
through variations in income distribution (the profit share). The downward shift in the saving
function has distributional implications in this Kaldorian model, and actually raises the profit
share and income inequality between capitalists and workers.
Piketty often expresses his skepticism about the explanation of income inequality based
on marginal productivity in Capital in the twenty first century, .30 This, however, should not
mask the centrality of his neo-classical version of income distribution theory in the seminal
book. The proposition that the low growth rate raises income inequality by increasing the
wealth-income ratio occupies substantial part of the book and Piketty uses the neo-classical
benchmark as the key theoretical framework to support the proposition.
In the Kaldorian model presented here, the e↵ect of changes in the growth rate on income
inequality is precisely opposite to that in the neo-classical framework. The observed decline
30

In particular, see Piketty’s discussion of increasing inequality of labor income in chapter 9 (Piketty, 2014).
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in the growth rate tends to reduce income inequality in this Kaldorian framework. Moreover,
Piketty’s proposition that a decline in the growth rate raises the aggregate wealth-income
ratio loses its significance here. I have distinguished financial wealth from reproducible capital
stock, and taken the ratio of reproducible capital to income as given at the outset. It has
been shown that a fall in the natural growth rate does not raise the aggregate financial
wealth-income ratio under plausible specifications of consumption/saving behavior, and that
the observed increase in the aggregate wealth-income ratio in the U.S. since the 1980s is
explained mostly by asset price inflation.
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Appendix I
Model II: Constant ratios of financial stocks to consumption
consumption/portfolio behavior is given by

The specification of

vNj = ↵
˜ j pCj
Mj = ˜j pCj

(33)
(34)

Combining these with the budget constraint, we get
pCj + ↵
˜ j pCj N̂ + ˜j npCj = pYj
Solving for pCj ,
pCj =

pYj
1+↵
˜ j N̂ +

jn

Plugging back into (33) and (34) and dividing through by pYj ,
vNj
↵
˜j
= ↵j =
pYj
1+↵
˜ j N̂ +
˜j
Mj
= j=
pYj
1+↵
˜ j N̂ +
Substituting (35) and (36) in !j = ↵j +
!j =

sj = ↵j N̂ +

j

(35)

jn

(36)

jn

and sj = ↵j N̂ +

j n,

we obtain

↵
˜ j + ˜j
1+↵
˜ j N̂ +
jn

=

jn

↵
˜ j N̂ + ˜j n
1+↵
˜ j N̂ +

jn

Model III: Consumption as a function of income and wealth
pCj = cj pYj + ⌫j (vNj + Mj )
✏j = vNj /Mj
Substituting vNj = ✏j Mj into the consumption function and the budget equation,
pCj = cj pYj + ⌫j (✏j + 1)Mj

(37)

pCj + vNj N̂ + Mj n = pCj + ✏j Mj N̂ + Mj n = pYj

(38)

Plugging (37) in (38),
cj pYj + ⌫j (✏j + 1)Mj + ✏j Mj N̂ + Mj n = pYj
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(39)

Rearranging and dividing by pYj ,
Mj
=
pYj
Because vNj = ✏j Mj , !j = ↵j +

j

=

j

1

cj

✏j N̂ + n + ⌫j (1 + ✏j )

and sj = ↵j N̂ +

j n,

we have

vNj
✏j (1 cj )
= ↵j =
pYj
✏j N̂ + n + ⌫j (1 + ✏j )

sj =
!j =

(✏j N̂ + n)(1

cj )

✏j N̂ + n + ⌫j (1 + ✏j )
(✏j + 1)(1 cj )
✏j N̂ + n + ⌫j (1 + ✏j )

Model IV: constant avereage saving rates
and (42) are rewritten into

sj =
!j =

j

=

1

c̄j

✏j N̂ + n

(✏j N̂ + n)(1

c̄j )

✏j N̂ + n
(✏j + 1)(1 c̄j )
✏j N̂ + n
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(41)

(42)
(43)

Setting cj = c̄j and ⌫j =, (41), (40), (43)

vNj
✏j (1 c̄j )
= ↵j =
pYj
✏j N̂ + n
Mj
=
pYj

(40)

(44)
(45)

(46)
(47)

Appendix II
Table 8 demonstrates the e↵ect of a decline in the growth rate from 0.038 to 0.024 on various
stock-flow ratios. The result shows that all ↵j and j (and their sum !j ) increase in Model II,
III and IV in response to the decrease in n. The increases in the ratios in Model IV, however,
are very large relative to those in Model II and III.
Table 8: The e↵ect of a fall in the growth rate on stock-flow ratios and average saving rates
Model I

Model II

Model III

Model IV

specification

vNj = ↵j pYj
Mj = j pYj

vNj = ↵
˜ j pCj
Mj = ˜j pCj

pCj = cj pYj + ⌫j (vNj + Mj )
✏j = vNj /Mj

pCj = c̄j pYj
✏j = vNj /Mj

parameters

↵c = 3.3,
c = 3.5,
↵w = 0.6,
w = 0.6

↵
˜ c = 3.365,
˜c = 4.099,
↵
˜ w = 0.616,
˜w = 0.616

cc = 0.514, ⌫c = 0.05,
✏c = 0.943
cw = 0.915, ⌫w = 0.05,
✏w = 1.00

c̄c = 0.854,
✏c = 0.943
c̄w = 0.975,
✏w = 1.00

↵c

3.3

3.470

3.670

4.964

c

3.5

3.680

3.892

5.264

!c

6.8

7.150

7.562

10.228

sc

0.097

0.102

0.108

0.146

↵w

0.6

0.605

0.665

0.9

w

0.6

0.605

0.665

0.9

!w

1.2

1.21

1.33

1.8

sw

0.0167

0.0170

0.0186

0.0252

notes: The parameter values for Model II, III and IV are chosen to produce the same stock/income ratios and
average saving rates as in Model I if n = 0.038. In other words, for all models, ↵c = 3.3, c = 3.5, !c = 6.8,
sc = 0.146, ↵w = 0.6, w = 0.6, !w = 1.2, and sw = 0.0252 when n = 0.038. The numbers in the table show
the e↵ect of a decrease in n to n = 0.024. For all cases, N̂ = 0.004.
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